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Abstract: The Nietzschean conception of selfhood has been the subject of considerable 
debate in the Anglophone commentary. This debate has been focused on what Sebastian 
Gardner coined as ‘the lack of fit’ between Nietzsche’s theoretical and practical remarks on 
the self. There have been various attempts at a solution to the lack of fit and in this article we 
address one such solution, which we call the ‘transcendental reading’. We argue that the 
reading is right to highlight that Nietzschean selfhood risks elimination of first-person 
practical agency. We contend, however, that the reading limits our understanding of his 
critique of a strictly first-person conception of selfhood. This critique aims to reject a 
conception of the self as distinct from the drives. We finally suggest an alternative solution to 
the lack of fit that takes into account the concerns of the transcendental reading, but seeks to 
overcome its limitations. 
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The diverse claims Nietzsche makes on selfhood have been the subject of considerable debate 
centred on the conception of selfhood to which he commits himself, or towards which he aims 
to lead his readers. These claims are scattered throughout his works, but at least some of them 
can be grouped into three claims that suggest a candidate for a Nietzschean picture on the self. 
First, he rejects the existence of such a ‘thing’ as the ‘will’, ‘self’, ‘ego’ or the ‘I’, which he 
construes as resting on belief in the ‘causality of the will’: 
 
The ‘inner world’ is full of illusions and phantasms: will is one of them. The will does not do anything 
anymore, and so it does not explain anything anymore either — it just accompanies processes, but it can 
be absent as well. The so-called ‘motive’: another error. Just a surface phenomenon of consciousness, 
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an ‘after-the-fact’ that hides the antecedentia of an act more than it reveals them. Not to mention the I 
[das Ich]! That has become a fairy tale, a fiction, a play on words: it has stopped thinking, feeling, and 
willing altogether! . . . What follows from this? There are no mental [geistigen] causes whatsoever! (TI, 
‘The Four Great Errors’, 3) 1  
 
Secondly, and somewhat in opposition to the above, there are passages such as the following 
where Nietzsche draws a distinction between what he calls the ‘real ego’ and the ‘phantom of 
the ego’: 
 
Whatever they may think and say about their ‘egoism’, the great majority nonetheless do nothing for 
their ego their whole life long: what they do is done for the phantom of their ego which has formed 
itself in the heads of those around them and has been communicated to them; — as a consequence they 
all of them dwell in a fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical 
evaluations, the one for ever in the head of someone else, and the head of this someone else again in the 
heads of others: a strange world of phantasms — which at the same time knows how to put on so sober 
an appearance!  (D 105)
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The majority of us are committed to acting for the ‘phantom of our ego’, but Nietzsche does 
not stop there. Further in the same passage he defends the possibility of a ‘real’ ego not 
accessible to an individual in this ‘great majority’; the individual to which he is referring is 
presumably the ‘sovereign individual’.3 He then proceeds to elaborate on the distinction 
between the ‘real’ and the ‘phantom’ of our ego in the following way: 
 
                                                 
1
 A little earlier in the same passage Nietzsche claims that concepts such as ‘thing’, ‘self’, ‘ego’ or the ‘I’ rest on 
the belief that the will is causally efficacious: “Of all these three ‘inner facts’ that together seem to guarantee 
causation, the first and most convincing is that of will as causal agent; the conception of a consciousness 
(‘mind’) as cause, and then that of the I  (the ‘subject’) as cause are just latecomers that appeared once causality 
of the will was established as given, as empirical … Nowadays we do not believe a word of it.” (TI, ‘The Four 
Great Errors’, 3) We quote Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols (A/EC/TI), 
Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman (Eds.), Judith Norman (Trans.), Cambridge 2005. 
2
 We quote Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on The Prejudices of Morality (D), Maudemarie Clark and 
Brian Leiter (Eds.), R.J. Hollingdale (Trans.), Cambridge 1997, p. 61. 
3
 Nietzsche uses Goethe as an example of the individual who sets up his own ego which annihilates the ‘general 
pale fiction’ of his age: “In the middle of an age inclined to unreality, Goethe was a convinced realist: he said 
yes to everything related to him, — his greatest experience was of that ens realissimum that went by the name of 
Napoleon.” (TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 49).  
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— all these people, unknown to themselves, believe in the bloodless abstraction ‘man’, that is to say, in 
a fiction; and every alteration effected to this abstraction by the judgments of individual powerful 
figures (such as princes and philosophers) produces an extraordinary and grossly disproportionate effect 
on the great majority — all because no individual among this majority is capable of setting up a real 
ego, accessible to him and fathomed by him, in opposition to the general pale fiction and thereby 
annihilating it. (D 105)
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Thirdly, and most importantly for the current debate, there are passages where he 
argues that we cannot possibly act without some reference to ourselves and so without a self 
to which our actions refer: 
 
No man has ever done anything that was done wholly for others and with no personal motivation 
whatever; how, indeed, should a man be able to do something that had no reference to himself, that is to 
say lacked all inner compulsion (which would have its basis in a personal need)? How could the ego act 
without the ego? (HH I: 133) 
 
We recognize three claims about the self that do not seem to hang together in such a 
way as to offer us a Nietzschean picture of selfhood. First, he rejects the existence of the ‘I’, 
though we should add that what he rejects is its conception as a ‘thing’, which implies an 
epiphenomenalist or eliminativist stance on the self as reducible to material causes or 
relations.
5
 Second, he rejects our self-knowledge claims by arguing that we are prone to 
confuse ‘our ego’ (the real ego) with other people’s opinions of us (the ‘phantom of our ego’), 
which suggests that he has a normative account of genuine selfhood. Third, he claims that we 
                                                 
4
 For a better understanding of what Nietzsche is aiming for, it is useful to compare this passage to the following, 
“‘Will a self’. - Active, successful natures act, not according to the dictum ‘know thyself’, but as if there hovered 
before them the commandment: will a self and thou shalt become a self. - Fate seems to have left the choice still 
up to them; whereas the inactive and contemplative cogitate on what they have already chosen, on one occasion, 
when they entered into life” (HH II: 366) we quote Friedrich Nietzsche, Human all too Human (HH I & II / WS), 
R.J. Hollingdale (Trans.), Cambridge 1996.  
5
 We can juxtapose this suggestion to the following passage that openly rejects materialism and voices his own 
aims, “While Copernicus convinced us to believe, contrary to all our senses, that the earth does not stand still, 
Boscovich taught us to renounce belief in the last bit of earth that did “stand still,” the belief in “matter,” in the 
“material,” in the residual piece of earth and clump of an atom: it was the greatest triumph over the senses that 
the world had ever known. – But we must go further still and declare war – a ruthless fight to the finish – on the 
“atomistic need” that, like the more famous “metaphysical need,” still leads a dangerous afterlife in regions 
where nobody would think to look” (BGE 12) we quote Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), 
Rolf-Peter Horstmann / Judith Norman (Eds.), Judith Norman (Trans.), Cambridge 2002. 
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cannot possibly act without some reference to ourselves, which he here construes as acting 
from some ‘inner compulsion’. Attempts to reconcile these diverse and ostensibly conflicting 
claims on selfhood have instigated a debate in the literature centred on what has come to be 
known as the ‘lack of fit’ argument.  
There are some attempts to resolve the lack of fit that, we claim, have their limitations 
and fall short of providing a satisfactory solution. In this paper we assess one of these 
attempts and its limitations, which we have coined as the ‘transcendental reading’. Some 
authors have suggested that Nietzsche must commit himself to a transcendental stance on 
agency by construing agential actions as grounded on the self-conscious ‘I’. This reading 
argues that Nietzsche should adopt a strategy similar to Kant, who in the second edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason famously claimed that, 
 
if the critique has not erred in teaching that the object should be taken in a twofold meaning, namely as 
appearance or as thing in itself; if its deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding is correct, and 
hence the principle of causality applies only to things taken in the first sense, namely insofar as they are 
objects of experience, while things in the second meaning are not subject to it; then just the same will is 
thought of in the appearance (in visible actions) as necessarily subject to the law of nature and to this 
extent not free, while yet on the other hand it is thought of as belonging to a thing in itself as not subject 
to that and hence free, without any contradiction hereby occurring.
6
  
 
For Kant, we can have a transcendental conception of ourselves as free and independent from 
our experience. When we try to make ourselves an object of experience, however, we do not 
conceive ourselves as free and independent, but as subjected to the same physical laws as any 
other object of experience. We can do the previous, Kant believes, without contradiction. We 
notice in Nietzsche, however, a vociferous rejection of the legitimacy of our positing things in 
themselves wholly independent from experience. Nietzsche’s concern is not with the posit of a 
thing in itself as a limiting concept whose relationship to experience is negative and therefore 
empty of significance
7
, but that this concept acquires significance through the moral actions it 
is supposed to underpin or explain: 
 
                                                 
6
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer / Allen W. Wood (Eds. & Trans.), New York 1998, p.116 
(B xxvii-xxviii). 
7
 See also, “Perhaps we shall then recognize that the thing in itself is worthy of Homeric laughter: that it 
appeared to be so much, indeed everything, and is actually empty, that is to say empty of significance” (HH I: 
16) 
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“Your insight into how such things as moral judgements could ever have come into existence would 
spoil these emotional words for you, as other emotional words, for example, `sin’, ‘salvation of the 
soul’, and ‘redemption’ have been spoiled for you. And now don’t bring up the categorical imperative, 
my friend! The term tickles my ear and makes me laugh despite your very serious presence. I am 
reminded of old Kant, who helped himself to (erschlichen) the ‘thing in itself’ — another very 
ridiculous thing! — and was punished for this when the ‘categorical imperative’ crept into 
(beschlichen) his heart and made him stray back to ‘God’, ‘soul’, ‘freedom’, ‘immortality’, like a fox 
who strays back into his cage.” (GS 335)8  
 
We should consequently be careful not to confuse Nietzsche’s transcendental stance on the 
self, if he had one, with acceptance of the Kantian conception of agency, which for Nietzsche 
includes the moral consequences of that conception.
9
 Whether Nietzsche is permitted to have 
a transcendental conception of agency without this conception being Kantian is, we believe, a 
question beyond the scope and consideration of the current paper.  
In this paper, we will discuss two important transcendental readings of Nietzsche, one 
by Sebastian Gardner (in section 2) and one by Chris Janaway (in section 3). Both Gardner’s 
and Janaway’s readings of Nietzschean agency are right to argue that we cannot eliminate the 
‘I’ without also eliminating first-person practical agency. They are equally right to argue that 
there is a lack of fit in our best interpretations of Nietzsche, if not in his own thoughts. We 
argue (in section 4) that Nietzsche had an alternative conception of agency that debunks the 
causal role of the ‘I’, but as suggested by the transcendental reading, this conception should 
not eliminate first-person practical agency. We submit, however, that construing his critique 
of the causal efficacy of the ‘I’ to imply its elimination is wrong. Instead, we claim (in section 
5) that Nietzsche’s critique is better construed as putting into question the supposed influence 
the ‘I’ has over our actions. This critique is aimed at the relation between the ‘I’-utterance and 
                                                 
8
 We quote Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (GS), Bernard Williams (Ed.), Josephine Nauckhoff and 
Adrian del Caro (Trans.), Cambridge 2001. 
9
 For a detailed and useful analysis of Nietzsche’s relationship to Kant see R. Kevin Hill, Nietzsche’s Critiques: 
The Kantian Foundations of his Thought, New York 2003, who is right to emphasise the differences between the 
two thinkers on agency: “whereas Kant believes that behind the merely synthetic unity of the apperceiving self, 
there is a noumenal self, Nietzsche claims that there is no such thing. There is only the body. A genuine 
substance must not be adjectival on any other substance or attribute and it must not be composed of parts. The 
body is composed of parts. Thus there is no substantial self, either ‘here’ or ‘elsewhere’. This, Nietzsche takes it, 
represents a critical advance beyond Kant’s position, and depends crucially upon his rejection of things-in-
themselves.” (p. 181) For further and a more in depth reading on Kant’s conception of selfhood see Henry E. 
Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, New Haven 2004, pp. 333-356.  
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its corresponding actions, which, we argue, reveals what we are calling the bridge between the 
first-person and third-person conceptions of selfhood. Nietzsche therefore seeks to argue for a 
different, more original and perhaps normative account of what constitutes ‘genuine’ agency. 
Towards the end of the paper we suggest an alternative solution and approach to the lack of fit 
problem. 
 
1. The Self and the ‘Lack of Fit’ Argument 
The ‘lack of fit’ is coined by Gardner10, whose reading of Nietzschean selfhood argues that 
there is a lack of fit between Nietzsche’s practical and theoretical claims on the self and that 
his philosophical project sought to reconcile them. The lack of fit then claims that Nietzsche’s 
practical account construes agency as a process of self-valuation, self-determination and self-
affirmation illustrated by his views on the sovereign individual. His theoretical account, 
however, construes the ‘I’ as a fiction and-or as reducible to hierarchal power relations 
between drives: 
 
Nietzsche describes the I as an illusion and a fiction ... it is not just the I of the philosophers, or the I as 
it may appear in reflection, but the I in all respects and contexts of consideration that is held to be 
illusory.
11
  
 
But, Gardner argues, in order for the sovereign individual to engage in the process of self-
valuation and so on, she must first believe in the reality of the ‘I’ which she uses in speaking 
and thinking about herself. She cannot do this, however, if this ‘I’ is construed as a fiction or 
if it is reduced to power relations between drives. Accordingly, the self in practice and the self 
in theory do not meet on a common ground.  
Nietzsche’s theoretical account does not offer enough argument for reducing the unity 
of the ‘I’ to power relations between drives, nor for explaining how (the belief in) this fiction 
arose in the first place. The first-person perspective of the ‘I’ does not meet with the third-
person perspective of what the self is construed as. If the ‘I’ in general is illusory, then how 
do we account for the sovereign individual’s practical agency, which requires the belief in the 
‘I’? Further, and granting that the sovereign individual practises agency on the basis of an 
                                                 
10
 Sebastian Gardner, Nietzsche, the Self, and the Disunity of Philosophical Reason, in: Ken Gemes / Simon May 
(Eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, New York 2009, pp. 1-31.  
11
 Gardner, Nietzsche, the Self and Disunity, p. 2. 
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illusion, how do we explain her belief in this illusion? This, in a nutshell, is what the ‘lack of 
fit’ amounts to and the problems that face Nietzsche’s account of the self and agency. 
Gardner proposes a solution to the lack of fit presumably without loss to Nietzsche’s 
central aims. The self-conscious unity of the ‘I’ has a transcendental, not a “transcendentally 
realistic” status.12 This allows that Nietzsche preserve his objections to the ‘I’, and so is 
sensitive to his theoretical claims, but does not lose the reality of the ‘I’, which is inherent to 
practical agency. The sovereign individual does not require the ‘I’ to have the status of “a 
substratum, nor as equipped with freedom in the indeterministic sense”, but “as occupying the 
position of ground”.13 This solution must hold “together in a coherent manner, both the 
unitary I of self-consciousness and the psychological manifold”.14  
One might clarify Gardner’s proposal via a distinction between cause and ground.15 
The cause of the content of the I-thought can be explained by interactions between third-
person composites (ibid.). For example, the thought “I want X” can be explained in terms of 
‘X’ being the effect of an interaction between drives that form hierarchal power relations. The 
unity of the ‘I’ that ‘wants X’, however, is independent from and serves as the ground for the 
composites and their hierarchy. Within this account is also the modest contention that this 
                                                 
12 Gardner illustrates this by arguing that, “there is a boundary to be marked and respected between legitimate 
transcendental claims for the necessity of the I-representation, and illegitimate, transcendentally realistic claims 
regarding the constitution-in-itself of a corresponding object of this representation” Gardner, Nietzsche, the Self 
and Disunity, p. 12. Presumably, in denying the reality of the ‘I’, Nietzsche makes this illegitimate claim.  
13 Gardner, Nietzsche, the Self and Disunity, p. 9.  
14
 Gardner, Nietzsche, the Self and Disunity, p. 13. 
15 Gardner describes the solution in the following manner, “this would allow it to be maintained both that the 
causality of the I is properly interpreted as involving necessarily the expression of the dominant power-unit in 
the psychological composite (or whatever functional arrangement Nietzschean theory tells us is involved), and 
that the thought, which the Nietzschean subject must entertain when a power-unit realizes itself successfully, 
wills values, etc., is an I-thought, not the thought that such and such a power-unit or whatever prevails presently” 
Gardner, Nietzsche, the Self and Disunity, p. 13. Nietzsche advocates a similar distinction between cause and 
ground, but contends that its utility and indispensability “proves nothing against its fictionality: a belief can be a 
condition of life and still be false [beweist noch nichts gegen ihre Erdichtetheit: es kann ein Glaube 
Lebensbedingung und trotzdem falsch sein]” (Nachlass, 38[3], KSA 11.598; our translation). Thus he is aware of 
the implications of abandoning the ‘I’ (and not simply its causality), as he says in Nachlass 7[63], KSA 12.317 
(our translation): “to let it go means to no longer be able to think [ihn fahren lassen heißt nicht-mehr-denken-
dürfen]”. Is this abandonment what Nietzsche is aiming for? It is our aim to argue that it is not. 
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self-conscious unity is presupposed by every act of thought and valuation.
16
 The ground of the 
I-thought, my first-person experience of ‘wanting X’, must be ineliminable by the third-person 
perspective of what causes my ‘want’. It is ‘I’ that wants X and not a drive or drive-relation. 
The self-conscious unity of the ‘I’ that is inherent to practical agency does not permit a self-
conception in terms of drives, even though our actions can be causally explained via relations 
between drives. This draws a clear boundary between the third-person composites and the 
first-person ‘I’, and so between the practical and the theoretical, which arguably resolves the 
‘lack of fit’ and preserves the first-person perspective required for practical agency.  
 
2. The Self in Nietzsche’s Drive Psychology 
Chris Janaway
17
, too, argues that there is a ‘lack of fit’ between Nietzsche’s practical and 
theoretical remarks, and that a strictly naturalist
18
 conception of agency falls short of self-
knowledge and self-valuation. Nietzsche then cannot eliminate the inherent unity of the self-
conscious ‘I’. Contra Gardner, he argues that the unity Nietzsche has in mind for his practical 
                                                 
16 Maudemarie Clark / David Dudrick, Nietzsche on the Will: An Analysis of BGE 19, in: Ken Gemes / Simon 
May (Eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, New York 2009, pp. 247-268, approach the will and 
willpower in this manner, but without the commitments associated here with the transcendental reading. Rather 
Nietzsche’s metaphor of political and so normative relations between drives allows him room to describe first-
person practical agency in third-person terms. We are indebted to their discussion on the important distinction 
between command and obedience on the one hand, and strength and weakness on the other, as relations between 
drives, which helped us towards recognising the bridge. Cf. Clark / Dudrick, Nietzsche on the Will, 2009, p. 266.  
17
 Chris Janaway, Autonomy, Affect, and the Self in Nietzsche’s Project of Genealogy, in: Ken Gemes / Simon 
May (Eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, New York 2009, pp. 51-68.  
18
 The accounts set up in opposition here are presumably those that read Nietzsche as an ‘epiphenomenalist’ 
about the conscious self, e.g. Brian Leiter, Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will, in: Ken Gemes / Simon May (Eds.) 
Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, New York 2009, pp. 107-126. See also Deleuze’s reading: “In Nietzsche 
consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to a superior to which he is subordinated or 
into which he is “incorporated”. Consciousness is never self-consciousness, but the consciousness of an ego in 
relation to a self which is not itself conscious.” (Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Hugh Tomlinson (Trans.), 
London 1983, p. 39. A similar reading and emphasis on the self as the unconscious operations of the body can be 
found in Klossowski who claims: “The Selbst, for Nietzsche, has a double meaning: on the one hand, it is, 
morally speaking, the Selbstsucht (the greediness of the self, which is erroneously translated as ‘egoism’), and on 
the other hand, it is force, unconscious to the cerebral consciousness, which obeys a hidden reason.”(Klossowski, 
Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, Daniel W. Smith  (Trans.), London 1969, p. 32.  
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exemplar is a distinct kind of unity not achievable by everyone: it is “a task reserved for a few 
of us rather than a given”.19 
 The main inconsistency, for Janaway, can be found in the relation between Nietzsche’s 
description of the individual, i.e. what the individual is, and what he prescribes for the 
individual, i.e. what is exemplary of agency. Nietzsche construes the individual as a complex 
of will-like components, i.e. drives, which form certain relations with one another. Hence, 
 
Given that this plurality of will-like striving components held in tension is what I am, it makes sense 
prima facie to hold that if I am to know anything, it must be through some activity of the drives that 
compose me and the feelings essentially involved in their activity.
 20 
 
A drive is “a relatively stable tendency to active behaviour of some kind” and an affect is 
“what it feels like when a drive is active within oneself”.21An affect is thus a consequence of a 
drive’s activity or interaction between drives.22 It is categorized in terms of inclination and 
aversion—a disposition towards or away from something. Affects are experienced as always 
in relation to some ‘thing’ in the broad sense, whether a concept, a topic or an object.23 
Without the relation between thing, affect and drive, and without the implied multiplicity of 
affects and drives in relation to a thing, there is no knowledge or objectivity. To know 
something, including oneself, is to do so through drives and affects, which colour our 
experiences. The basic unit or composite of the self or agency in this reading then is the 
‘drive’. 24 
                                                 
19
 Janaway, Autonomy, Affect and the Self, p. 65. 
20
 Janaway, Autonomy, Affect and the Self, p. 56 
21
 Janaway, Autonomy, Affect and the Self, pp. 55-6 
22
 Janaway, Autonomy, Affect and the Self, p. 52 
23
 Cf. Janaway, Autonomy, Affect and the Self, p. 54 
24 We have followed Janaway in avoiding the discussion of construing the drives as “miniature subjects” or 
“under-souls” Janaway, Autonomy, Affect and the Self, pp. 55-6. This discussion is not immediately relevant for 
our purposes, but a note merits its place here to explain why we postulate what we are calling ‘the bridge’. We 
cannot correctly attribute a self or the unity of the self to any individual drive. We can construe the self as an 
order, formation, or interaction between drives, but each drive cannot be construed as a self, for we are then 
moving the complexity of the self as a multiplicity of drives and their interactions one drive. To have a self, in 
the only sense we know (in third-person terms), is to have a multiplicity of drives. But, this is nothing special or 
new. We employ the same reasoning when we consider the compositions of other objects. Let us take the classic 
example of the chair to illustrate this point. In certain contexts, primarily the scientific, we construe the chair as a 
multiplicity of atoms or subatomic motions with certain relations, but we do not construe each atom as a chair-
10 
 
 The above characterises Nietzsche’s theoretical account of agency. His practical 
account depicts a different picture. The agent is construed as active and self-conscious, and 
who must possess and have power over his or her drives and affects: 
 
To have one’s pro and contra in one’s power is to make one’s knowledge more ‘objective’; the plurality 
of affects, the greatest possible difference in affective interpretations, is ‘useful’ for knowledge and 
makes it more ‘complete’.
25
  
 
Relevant for agency in the above quote is the notion of ‘having one’s pro and contra in one’s 
power’, and what is implied by ‘having in one’s power’. In BGE 284, Nietzsche speaks of 
“freely having”, “to seat oneself on them as on horses”, and “know how to employ”.  Similar 
claims are present in HH I Pref. 6, where he speaks of “becoming master over yourself”, and 
asserts that “you shall get control over your for and against”. These passages purportedly lead 
Nietzsche to dissolving “the self into a multiplicity of affects and drives”, and sticking to “his 
                                                                                                                                                        
atom. Other than being objects composed of atoms, chairs have certain practical functions or aesthetic properties. 
Thus we cannot describe or construe the part in terms of the whole, i.e. the atoms that compose a chair in terms 
of chair-atoms, or the drives that compose the self in terms of self-drives. We can construe the whole and how it 
works through the relations between its parts, but we cannot reduce nor eliminate the whole in favour of its parts. 
We can certainly imagine calling an atom a chair-atom in certain contexts where the boundaries between 
different objects are highlighted and analysed: we can say that this atom here is a chair-atom and not a table-
atom, i.e. it belongs to the chair and not to the table. In order for the previous to make sense a relation of identity, 
or an act of identification, must take place between the particular atom and the chair, and so between the one 
perspective on an object and another; e.g. this atom here X is identified with and belongs to this chair Y and not 
to another object Z, i.e. the table. This act of identification we are calling the ‘bridge’, which shows us that there 
is only a difference in perspective between the self as that which utters “I this or that” and the complex of drives. 
Our language shows us only a difference in perspectives: how we transition from one to the next and how we 
employ both towards different ends. Nothing more than that. What then is a chair? It is something we ordinarily 
construct, trade, sit on etc., but also a complex of atoms, both of which are two different perspectives on the 
same thing. The question we ought to ask is how does, or how can, one possibly reduce or eliminate a 
perspective? The same reasoning occurs when we think of and talk about persons. George is a gentleman who 
adores the Oriental cuisine and Beethoven, but some of us are also aware that he is also a body with cells and 
organs that operate on electro-chemical reactions, which lead to relatively stable and recurring behaviours 
construed as drives. When we finally converse with him, however, we notice that the latter picture sinks from 
our focus and we approach him as a person with desires, hopes and intentions. Nietzsche cannot eliminate this 
difference in perspective, nor, we argue, does he aim to do so. 
25
 Janaway, Autonomy, Affect and the Self, p. 52. 
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aims at improving our capacity for knowing and skilfully using our affects”.26 If the ‘I’ and 
‘self-knowledge’ are only relations between drives and affects, then how can I control or 
possess them? Possession implies a distinction and separation between the possessed and the 
possessor, and a unity in the possessor rejected by Nietzsche.
27
 I cannot confuse myself with 
my possessions if I am to call them ‘mine’.28 If affects A and B both speak interchangeably 
about a subject matter and I am to harness, possess or identify with either or both, then I 
require a self-conscious unity that is distinct from what is unified. Consequently, for Janaway, 
the previous is only possible for “unified self-conscious subjects, subjects of ‘I’-thoughts”.29  
 This need not introduce the metaphysical implications that Nietzsche is determined to 
avoid; the unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ is not a metaphysical substratum. Nevertheless, the 
unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ is indispensable to preserving the reality of first-person 
practical agency. The main difference between Gardner’s and Janaway’s reading is that the 
former construes self-conscious unity as inherent to agency as such, whereas the latter sees 
                                                 
26
 Janaway, Autonomy, Affect and the Self, p. 60. 
27 See also Chris Janaway, Morality, Drives, and Human Greatness, in: Chris Janaway / Simon Robertson 
(Eds.), Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity, Oxford 2012, pp. 183-201; see especially pp. 192-195 for a 
further discussion of why Nietzsche requires the self-conscious ‘I’. 
28 The point highlighted by Janaway is regarding thoughts of self-identification and self-possession, which he 
argues cannot be reduced to relations between drives. We believe the problem is better posed by asking whether 
in construing people in terms of drive-relations, we risk losing first-person practical agency? We aim to show 
that Nietzsche’s proposed conception of genuine agency avoids this loss. We can construe the ‘I’ and the content 
it identifies with (the ‘I’-thoughts) as the majority in relation to the minority using Nietzsche’s political metaphor 
(BGE 19). Interactions between I-thoughts can be also construed as interactions between an already established 
order of drives and an activity of drives that disrupt that order. We ought to be clear, however, that this merely 
shifts Nietzsche’s understanding of the ‘I’ from one perspective to another. It does not in any way commit him to 
a loss of the ‘I’-perspective, or its unity. We are speaking about the same thing, person and activity here and not 
two different things, people or activities. Simply put when you ‘look’ into me and describe what you see, it is 
still me you are looking into and not something or someone else. Though the ‘I’ is inherently unified by virtue of 
what he calls the seductions of language and grammar, its content, i.e. its affective states and action-tendencies 
(or even thoughts), are nevertheless not necessarily so. The ‘I’’s inherent unity then is merely that of a practice 
or a game, that sometimes accords with its content and sometimes not, but in all cases it refers to that content and 
to nothing else—certainly not to some special, simple and unrelated unity or thing in itself. For a more elaborate 
and alternative discussion of Nietzsche’s third-person conception of the ‘self’ see Lanier Anderson, What is a 
Nietzschean Self?, in: Chris Janaway / Simon Robertson (Eds.), Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity, Oxford 
2012, pp. 202-235.  
29
 Janaway, Autonomy, Affect and the Self, p. 60. 
12 
 
the sovereign individual’s agential unity as an achievement and task set for the few.30 
Janaway shows us a distinction between two types of unity: one inherent to practical agency 
as such that requires the self-conscious unity of the ‘I’, and the other of the sovereign 
individual that represents a unity constitutive of self-knowledge. We agree with Janaway that 
practical agency requires the self-conscious ‘I’, but agency as such for Nietzsche does not 
require self-knowledge or even consciousness.
31
 Janaway is also right to claim that self-
knowledge distinguishes the sovereign individual from ordinary agents, but this is insufficient 
to account for the sovereign individual’s distinct agential unity. The sovereign individual does 
not only have self-knowledge, but also self-mastery
32
, which is arguably more than having 
knowledge of one’s drives and affects.33  
 
3. The Challenges of the Transcendental Reading 
Both Gardner and Janaway’s readings of Nietzschean agency are right to argue that we cannot 
eliminate the ‘I’ without also eliminating first-person practical agency. They are also right to 
argue that there is a lack of fit in our best interpretations of Nietzsche, if not his own thoughts. 
                                                 
30 See for example: “none of this shows that self-knowledge is impossible: only that it is rare among human 
beings, that it is a task set for a few of us rather than a given, and that its achievement is a matter of degree” 
(Janaway, Autonomy, Affect and the Self, p. 65). 
31 Cf. GS 354: “For we could think, feel, will, remember, and also ‘act’ in every sense of the term, and yet none 
of all this would have to ‘enter our consciousness’ (as one says figuratively)”.  
32 See for example Nietzsche’s description and the language he uses for the sovereign individual: “… and how 
could he, with his self-mastery, not realize that he has been given mastery over circumstances, over nature and 
over all her creatures… The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness 
of this rare freedom and power over himself and his destiny, has penetrated him to his lowest depths and become 
an instinct, his dominant instinct…” (GM II 2) We quote Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality 
(GM), Keith Ansell-Pearson (Ed.), Carol Diethe (Trans.), New York 1997, p. 37. The description here is 
saturated with words that indicate not only self-knowledge but also self-mastery; self-knowledge is thus 
necessary but insufficient for self-mastery; see GS 17, 78, 79, 99, 290 & 299 for more on the relationship 
between self-knowledge and self-mastery. 
33 Robert Pippin, How to Overcome Oneself: Nietzsche on Freedom, in: Ken Gemes / Simon May (Eds.), 
Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, New York 2009, pp. 69-88, also contends that the sovereign individual is 
“a complete and hierarchical unity among states of one’s soul, memories, desires, aversions, and so forth” (p. 
77). He adds that it “is a distinct sort of psychological self-relation, both attitudinal and dispositional—in order 
to be capable of any real practical intentionality or real agency” ( p. 79). He further adds that this unity requires 
us to assume what Nietzsche is attempting to avoid, namely an “independence between a creator or ruler self and 
a created object and “commonwealth”” (p. 78), which unfortunately leads us back, full-circle, to the lack of fit.  
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They are wrong, however, in claiming that rejection of the causal role of the ‘I’ entails its 
elimination.
34
  
 The transcendental reading reveals two difficulties in Nietzsche’s claims on selfhood. 
First, the practical and theoretical conflict due to the presumed theoretical elimination and 
simultaneously the practical commitment to the ‘I’. Second, the claim that the unity of the 
self-conscious ‘I’ is wholly distinct from the drives but somehow arises from the drives or 
some drive-relation ? anything what ? requires explanation. The account can thus be 
summarised as follows: 
 
1. The third-person perspective on agency shows a complex multiplicity of drives brought 
into unity by hierarchical power relations which generate actions. 
2. The first-person perspective shows a simple unity and sense of ownership and control over 
our actions. 
3. The simple unity of first-person practical agency cannot be explained via drives; it grounds 
practical agency, and this is attributed to the self-conscious ‘I’.  
4. By being inherent to first-person practical agency, the self-conscious ‘I’ is distinct from the 
third-person drives and ineliminable. 
 
The concern here is with the move from 1 to 2. The transcendental reading contends that 2 
cannot be explained by a naturalist and strict third-person account of selfhood. Relations 
between drives cannot account for the unity of first-person practical agency. They contend 
that 3 and 4 must follow to explain the relation between 1 and 2.
35
  
 The transcendental reading is correct in claiming that first-person practical agency 
requires the ‘I’, and that insofar as we engage in first-person practical agency we cannot 
eliminate it. One cannot fully construe nor relate to oneself as a set of drives.
36
 An agential 
                                                 
34 See especially Gardner, Nietzsche, the Self and Disunity, pp. 6-7, and Chris Janaway, Beyond Selflessness, 
New York 2007, p. 217. 
35 For an alternative discussion and solution to the lack of fit than we have presented here, but which accords 
with our objections to the transcendental reading, see Anderson, What is a Nietzschean Self?, pp. 203-208.  
36 There are some thinkers, i.e. Paul M. Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitude, in: 
The Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), pp. 67-90, who hold an eliminativist materialist position by arguing for the 
redundancy of first-person self-expression and self-reference, which requires revisions in how we communicate 
about ourselves and our experiences. Churchland’s eliminativism entail’s a revision of language, i.e. adding and 
removing linguistic expressions (pp. 88-9), in favour of a more accurate explanation and prediction of behaviour. 
Materialistic descriptions then should take precedence because they purportedly better explain behaviour. The 
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action can be causally-explained in terms of drives and affects in the third-person, e.g. John 
bought flowers and asked Julie on a date because his sexual drives (coupled with other drives) 
were active in her presence. John, however, is also aware that he bought flowers and asked 
Julie out, not a set of drives. John’s attribution of his affects and actions to himself as opposed 
to a drive or drive-relation, cannot be explained by the drives. Nietzsche must therefore accept 
the ‘I’, along with the belief in it, for the sake of first-person practical agency, in which his 
sovereign individual must also engage.
37
  
 It is vital to note, however, that Nietzsche’s critique of the ‘I’ is not concerned with its 
utility, but with whether or not it is sufficient to be the genuine determinant and source of our 
actions and values. In other words, Nietzsche poses the following question: is simply saying ‘I 
will do this or that’ sufficient for the deed to ensue? Can its inherent unity be attributed to that 
                                                                                                                                                        
aim of the eliminative materialist is therefore accuracy in the prediction and explanation of behaviour. It is 
dubious that the same aim can be attributed to Nietzsche (cf. GS 121, BGE 24, Nachalass 1885, 34[253], KSA 
11.506; Nachlass 1885, 38[3], KSA 11.597f.; Nachlass 1886-1887, 7[63], KSA 12.317). His aims are self-
affirmation and the enhancement of life with focus on how our ideas about life, morality, reality and ourselves 
affects the affirmation and enhancement of life. Whether these aims can be achieved by an eliminativist 
materialist proposal about the redundancy of linguistic practices is something that Nietzsche would have to deny. 
He criticizes the will to truth because the conditions of life may require error or lies (cf. HH I Pref. 1, GS 121 
and BGE 16). 
37 Chris Janaway, Nietzsche, the Self, and Schopenhauer. in: Keith Ansell-Pearson (Ed.), Nietzsche and Modern 
German Thought, London 1990, pp. 119-142, is right to claim that we cannot speak of agency without in some 
sense presupposing the subject: “we must still use the concept subject even if not of any single entity” (p.135). 
Nevertheless, given the possibility of errors in self-knowledge, using the concept is not sufficient to ground the 
assumptions that the concept makes about agency, i.e. its presupposing the sort of ownership and control “that 
gives style, imposes accord, identifies with all of its actions, harnesses or controls the many drives and affects” 
(p. 137). That they are mine or attributed to me is some paces away from my being able to control them; control, 
or self-mastery as Nietzsche calls it, is not given by the ‘I’. Janaway is right to argue that the ‘I’ is inherent to 
first-person practical agency, but we ought to be careful not to give the concept ‘I’ a more privileged status than 
that of a concept, i.e. a way of representing the relationship between our resolve and our actions, which may or 
may not be as unified as the inherent unity of the ‘I’ suggests. We must also be clear that agential unity rests on a 
lot more than the use of the concept ‘I’. The ‘I’ is not sufficient for agency as such, though it is necessary for 
first-person practical agency. The unity of the ‘I’ and the unity of agency (the relationship between one’s actions 
and one’s will or resolve) ought to therefore be distinguished. In other words, we have to take seriously 
Nietzsche’s claim that the concept of the subject or the ‘I’ is trapped in the seductions of language and 
grammar—more work and discussion can go on the relationship between the ‘I’ and language, in Nietzsche. For 
a collection of essays that seek to address this see João Constâncio / Maria João Mayer Branco (Ed.), As the 
Spider Spins: Essays on Nietzsche’s Critique and Use of Language, Berlin / Boston 2012.   
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to which it refers, i.e. agency and so the relationship between one’s resolve and one’s actions. 
Nietzsche is probing us to reconsider whether our actions are as unified as our ‘I’-claims 
suggest and whether ‘we’, the first-person ‘I’, are the true causal determinants of our actions. 
This is easier to follow if we consider his arguments against self-knowledge. Since we can err 
in what we know about ourselves and thereby act and communicate about our actions in 
accordance with this error, then we cannot raise first-person practical agency to the seat of 
agency as such. The ‘I’ is therefore insufficient for a complete account of agency, which 
should include or explain the errors in self-knowledge, or the lack of self-knowledge.
38
  
 If the inherent unity of the ‘I’ would be sufficient for agency, then, irrespective of the 
relationship between our resolve and our actions, we would all practice genuine agency. What 
we think about ourselves and our values, however, is not always correct or even correlated by 
our actions. The relationship between first-person practical agency and weakness of will leads 
Nietzsche to offer an alternative account of genuine agency that rests on the relationship 
between one’s resolve and one’s actions. Since the ‘I’ refers equally to both a weak and a 
strong will, its inherent unity can be misleading by suggesting the kind of unity constitutive of 
a strong will, i.e. a will whose resolve and actions are in harmony. It is on this basis that he 
construes the ‘I’ as a fiction or illusion. This shows us then that Nietzsche is not questioning 
the ‘I’ as such, but its authority independent from its correlating actions. He challenges us to 
act in accordance with what we think and reason about ourselves and to give our actions the 
kind of unity we profess to have in first-person practical agency. Notice, however, that this 
does not commit him to reduction or elimination of first-person practical agency, only to a 
critique of the scope of its inherent unity and its legitimacy with respect to genuine agency. 
 
4. Towards an Alternative Solution 
                                                 
38 Paul Katsafanas, Nietzsche on Agency and Self-Ignorance, in: Journal of Nietzsche Studies 43 (2012),  pp. 5-
17, offers a very useful and detailed discussion of the role of self-knowledge in Nietzschean agency. We agree 
with him that Nietzsche’s views on agency mounts an attack on previous conceptions, with a view towards a new 
and unique account of what constitutes genuine agency. However, Katsafanas’s interpretation still leads us to the 
lack of fit. This is because although he rightly rejects epiphenomenalism and its opposite, he still holds the view 
that we argue Nietzsche is trying to avoid: a kind of interactive dualism between drives and conscious thought, 
deemed to be, and in fact must be, an interaction between two distinct things, which leans on conscious thought 
by contending that genuine agency can only be understood in terms of the central role that conscious thought 
plays in our actions.  
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There are two implicit commitments in the transcendental reading’s solution to the lack of fit 
that are not sympathetic to Nietzsche’s critique of agency, and leads us to misconstruing his 
aims of offering an alternative account of genuine agency. 
 The first commitment can be located in Gardner’s proposal, which claims that the 
unity of the self is grounded in the self-conscious ‘I’.39 We will call this the ‘false identity 
commitment’. The use of ground here is unclear. If by ground we mean the ground of first-
person practical agency, then Gardner’s challenge is correct. If by ground, however, we mean 
the ground of agency as such, then Nietzsche’s critique is illuminating. We do not know 
ourselves as well as we claim, and we moreover do not have the kind of mastery over our 
actions suggested to us in first-person practical agency (see D 105 & 115; also BGE 17 & 19). 
We can err in what we assume to be driving our actions (see HH Pref. 1). For example, Julie 
may think of herself as a very altruistic and generous person, who will help a friend in need, 
and she does. Later she experiences a situation where she is now in need, but the same friend 
does not help her. She responds with anger and scornfully reminds him of the time she helped 
him. Later she reflects on the situation and is bewildered by her response. She wonders if she 
is in fact an egoistic person, because only egoism would motive her subsequent expectation of 
reciprocity and anger at its lack. Nietzsche offers us similar examples of the errors and 
deceptions of first-person experience (see GM, Pref. 1, and HH, Pref. 3; see also TI, The Four 
Great Errors), and highlights the limitations of our self-conscious access to the totality of our 
activities, their motivations and their geneses (see especially D 115).  
 Nietzsche is, we believe, making the following claim: if we can err about our 
motivations and our self-image, then we cannot assume that the unity of the ‘I’ is the ground 
of agency as such, even though the ‘I’ itself is indispensable to first-person practical agency. 
 The false identity commitment incorrectly establishes a relationship of identity 
between the unity of the ‘I’ and the unity of agency as such, which Nietzsche is rejecting in 
the majority of us.
40
 We assume that we are unified and that we act in accordance with this 
                                                 
39 See also Anderson, What is a Nietzschean Self?, p. 213, for a similar objection to Gardner’s reading.  
40 Paul Katsafanas, The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche, Plato and Schiller, in: Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 49 (2011), pp. 87-113, argues that conscious thought and reflection are necessary for 
distinguishing between ordinary and genuine agency. He contends that Nietzschean agential unity is best 
characterised by the relationship “between drives and other parts of the individual”, namely, “self-conscious 
thought” (p. 103). The lack of fit problem shows us, however, that Nietzsche cannot explain how self-conscious 
thought can work given our third-person identification with drives. The claim that the agent is not only a set of 
drives, but also has other parts, bypasses the problem of the lack of fit, but does not resolve it. It moves its 
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unity, but this is undermined by the many cases in which we act in discordance with our self-
image. Nietzsche’s unique account of genuine agency then begins without the premise that the 
unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ is synonymous with agency as such, or that the unity of the ‘I’ 
is somehow imposed on our actions. Therefore, first-person practical agency is necessary, but 
insufficient for genuine agency. Nietzsche’s practical exemplar requires more than the ability 
to speak and think in terms of an ‘I’, or participate in first-person practical agency, to be 
practising genuine agency. 
 The second commitment follows from the previous by holding that the unity of the 
self-conscious ‘I’ is distinct from and cannot be explained by the drives; it is irreducible and 
ineliminable.
41
 The unity of the ‘I’ is inherent to agency, but separated from any propositions 
about it in third-person terms. We will call this the subjectivity commitment. This 
commitment is often used to resolve the lack of fit, but leads to shifting its burden. This shift 
of burden can be best captured by the following question: how can something be constituted 
by drives but not be explicable in their terms, or how can it possibly interact with the drives 
without, in some way, being the same kind of thing, i.e. a drive or drive-relation?   
                                                                                                                                                        
burden elsewhere. We now require a story that explains the interaction between drives and self-conscious 
thought, just as we require one for the ‘I’ as a faculty and the drives. It is unfortunate that Katsafanas did not 
explore a solution to this, cf. Katsafanas, Unified Agency, p. 113, footnote 57.      
41 Paul Katsafanas, Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization, in: European Journal of 
Philosophy 13 (2005), pp. 1–31, pp. 11-13 is also aware of this commitment as well as of the central issue of the 
relationship between consciousness and the drives. He contends that the problem of consciousness arises from 
representing it as a faculty of awareness. What Nietzsche really denies is not consciousness per se, but the 
approach to consciousness as a faculty (p. 12). We agree with Katsafanas that Nietzsche does not seek to 
undermine consciousness as such, but its being conceived as faculties. This resolves the problem of how 
conscious agency is possible, and gets us as far as saving first-person practical agency. This does not resolve the 
lack of fit, however. If self-conscious thought is not a drive nor a faculty, and not even a thing or object, then 
how can it interact with the drives without also being “in the trenches with the drives” (John Richardson, 
Nietzsche’s Freedoms, in: Ken Gemes / Simon May (Ed.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, New York 
2009, pp. 125-149, p. 137)? Consciousness, in this reading, remains a phantom that somehow effects the basic 
unit explanatory of relatively stable behaviour. The phantom arises, we suggest, because we do not notice that 
Nietzsche is thinking in terms of a bridge between first and third-person perspectives on agency. He does not 
construe them as things distinct in kind that somehow interact with and affect one another, but as two 
conceptions of the same thing or activity, one of which can be misleading with respect to that activity. For an 
alternative and very useful analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of consciousness, conceptual content and the ‘self’ 
see João Constâncio, Consciousness, Communication, and Self-Expression: Towards an Interpretation of 
Aphorism 354 of Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, in: Constâncio / Mayer Branco (Eds.), As the Spider Spins, pp. 
197-231. 
18 
 
 The subjectivity commitment leaves Nietzsche with the following undesirable 
impasse. All agential actions are constituted by or are the consequences of something that is 
indiscernible in the third-person, whilst simultaneously it is accessible to us through the first-
person as the unity of the ‘I’. There is something in one perspective that cannot be located nor 
perceived in the other. Nietzsche’s critique of agency can, as we have shown, accommodate 
the ‘I’ as a practice, but must abandon its inherent unity if it attributes it not just to how we 
think and speak about ourselves, but to agency as such, i.e. to the relationship between one’s 
resolve and one’s actions. Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysical dualism and his insistence on 
the identity of the will (self, or agent) with the body inherited from Schopenhauer
42
, entails 
that he must both defend and illustrate the following: the ‘I’ and what occurs in first-person 
practical agency is in some way accountable by a manifold of third-person drives. Such an 
account, we argue, is available to him, but only on the basis of what we call the bridge (more 
on this below). 
 The key requirement for the transcendentalists is that Nietzsche shows us how the 
above is possible without elimination of the first-person perspective, which they argue is 
unavailable to Nietzsche’s theoretical account. But, as we have seen, it is unclear whether 
elimination here is of the use of the ‘I’ which refers to the relationship between one’s resolve 
and one’s actions, or elimination of the unity between one’s resolve and actions that he denies 
in the majority of us first-person users of the ‘I’. This lack of clarity, we suggest, constitutes 
the central limitation of the transcendental reading.
43
 If the individual in the third-person is a 
                                                 
42 See for example Z I, The Despisers of the Body: “body am I through and through, and nothing besides; and 
soul is just a word for something on the body.” We quote Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book 
for All and None (Z), Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. Pippin (Eds.), Adrian Del Caro (Trans.), New York 2006, 
p. 23. For an account of Schopenhauer’s will-body identity see John E. Atwell, Schopenhauer: The Human 
Character, Philadelphia 1990, pp. 27-42. For a thorough comparison between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on 
drives and consciousness see João Constâncio, On Consciousness: Nietzsche’s Departure from Schopenhauer, 
in: Nietzsche-Studien 40 (2011), pp. 1-42. 
43
 An alternative reading of the Nietzschean self that can be set up in opposition to the transcendental reading, is 
the Humean bundle theory of the self. Hume grounded his conception of the self on the claim that the “self or 
person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a 
reference” (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate Norton / Mary J. Norton (Eds.), New York 
2000, p. 164). He then proceeded to argue that no such idea or impression exists, but we have several such ideas 
and impressions. Consequently the self or person is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, 
which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes 
cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; 
and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which 
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multiplicity of drives, and in the first-person she practises a unity that owns and is distinct 
from her drives, then there must be something parallel to this unity in the drives—a state of 
affairs, relation, or activity—that corresponds to the first-person unity, even if it is not 
reducible to it. The claim should be construed as offering two different perspectives on the 
same ‘thing’ or activity, which would make his claims on genuine agency coherent without 
entailing a third-person phantom. Nietzsche indeed cannot claim that one perspective has a 
truth-value which negates or renders the other superfluous, but must show us a bridge 
between the two that makes his third-person analysis and conception of the ‘self’ coherent. 
Elimination is thereby justifiably out of the question. 
 We agree with the transcendental reading that Nietzsche requires an account of the 
self-conscious ‘I’ that fits with first-person practical agency. This account, however, must tell 
us more than that the ‘I’ is a unity separate from or unrelated to our other experiences, and 
that we are this unity. We seemingly have two options. Firstly, the ‘I’ is some ‘thing’, but the 
kind of thing that we cannot perceive, which entails a commitment to metaphysical dualism 
and reduces the ‘I’ to a third-person phantom.44 Second, the ‘I’ is not a ‘thing’, but a practice 
we engage in. The ‘I’ becomes apparent as a problem only when we ask ‘what is it?’, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions 
successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and 
situations” (p. 165). A discussion on the relationship between Hume and Nietzsche’s conception of selfhood is 
very useful for showing how Nietzsche fits in the history of philosophy. A comparison between Humean 
passions and Nietzschean drives would also be useful to unpacking some of the limitations of a strictly naturalist 
reading of Nietzschean agency. This is beyond the scope of the current paper, however, and so we will settle for 
pointing to some papers that directly or indirectly deal with the issue as a first-step towards a broader discussion 
on the topic. For a Humean reading of Nietzschean selfhood that is also conscious of the limitations of a Humean 
approach to the Nietzschean self can be found in Anderson, What is a Nietzschean Self?, pp. 202-235. Anderson 
rightly claims that Nietzsche’s conception of selfhood sounds similar to a Humean bundle theory, but 
emphasises a key difference: “drives and affects are themselves standing attitudes that persist, rather than 
fleeting, occurrent states à la Hume” (p. 224). For an alternative and very compelling argument on why 
Nietzsche’s conception of the self is distinct from Hume’s see Gardner, who argues that Hume’s theoretical-
practical disunity differs from Nietzschean disunity by virtue of their differing philosophical projects, “the 
enlightened Nietzschean subject, who does not receive values passively from nature but is bound to innovate 
them, and who is consequently exposed to the full battery of reflective questions which, in the Humean subject, 
the operation of the passions obviates the need and leaves no scope for” (Gardner, Nietzsche, the Self and 
Disunity, p. 17). For a more detailed comparison between Hume and Nietzsche see Brian Leiter, Routledge 
Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality, London 2002.  
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begin to locate that which corresponds to it. Though we do not and cannot possibly do so, it 
commits us to believing in it because we use it. Both alternatives leave us with a kind of 
phantom, which Nietzsche is trying to avoid. But to succeed in avoiding it, he requires a 
bridge between first-person practical agency and the third-person manifold that preserves his 
critique of both transcendentalist and naturalist accounts of agency
45
, along with his 
conception of genuine agency.  
 The transcendental reading loses sight of Nietzsche’s alternative conception of 
genuine agency, and the fact that this commits him to avoiding reduction or elimination. This 
is patent in his rejection of naturalist hypotheses that are ‘causal mechanistic’46. Not all third-
person accounts of agency need be ‘causal-mechanistic’ and so fall short of representing the 
‘I’. The ‘I’ is not sufficient for genuine agency, but we must not construe it and that to which 
it refers as separated from the third-person perspective. Consequently, to preserve the ‘this-
worldliness’ of the agent or self, but also not lose an important practice, Nietzsche requires a 
‘bridge’ between the two perspectives.47 If what we are calling the bridge here is implausible, 
                                                                                                                                                        
44 See Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, New York 1983, pp. 131-140, for a detailed discussion of why Nietzsche is 
adamant to reject this solution.  
45 It is important to note here that our rejection of the transcendentalist reading does not entail that we accept a 
strict causal-naturalist or even epiphenomenalist reading of Nietzschean first-person practical agency, defended 
by Brian Leiter, The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-creation, in: Brian Leiter / John Richardson (Eds.), Nietzsche, 
New York 2001, pp. 281-321. See also Brian Leiter, Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will, in: Leiter /Richardson 
(Eds.), Nietzsche, pp. 107-126, for a more recent and in many respects similar position. We argue conversely 
that Nietzsche is aiming for and requires a middle-ground between the drives and ‘I’-thoughts, which must 
accommodate the theoretical value of a drive and the practical value of the ‘I’. What we have called the bridge 
between the first-person and third-person here is an attempt at such middle-ground.   
46 Cf. BGE 12: “Between you and me, there is absolutely no need to give up “the soul” itself, and relinquish one 
of the oldest and most venerable hypotheses – as often happens with naturalists: given their clumsiness, they 
barely need to touch “the soul” to lose it”. 
47
 For a very useful and informative attempt to resolve the lack of fit see Constâncio, On Consciousness, pp. 1-
42. Constâncio aims to resolve the lack of fit by ascribing ‘perspectives’ to drives in accordance with what the 
“continuum model” (pp. 21-26). He claims that “as perspectival valuations, the drives are always changing and 
adapting to their surroundings — so that at every moment the “total state” of the organism is a cluster of 
perspectival relations, not an aggregate of mechanical, causal relations among atomic parts” (p. 23). We agree 
with him that causal interaction between the ‘I’ and the drives is what Nietzsche is trying to undermine for 
precisely the reason that it commits him to some kind of atomism (and brings back what we are calling the 
phantom), which he seeks to avoid. We disagree that Nietzsche could replace causal interactions with 
perspectival interactions between the drives, or that Nietzsche sought to ascribe a perspective to a drive in any 
strict sense. Our disagreement rests on the homunculi problem, i.e. the drives as miniature agents, which is 
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then he must adhere to some form of dualism that affords privileged status to first-person 
practical agency. This would require him to accept that something participates in, influences 
or even determines our actions that we cannot perceive nor conceive from any other 
perspective than the first-person, wherein the most we can conceive about it is that it shows a 
distinct kind of unity, ownership and identification with our actions. (It is important to 
highlight here that, for our purposes, Nietzsche does not have to give us a positive account of 
what the third-person parallel to the ‘I’ is, but rather that he commits himself to it and thinks 
on the basis of this commitment; alternatively, his thoughts on genuine agency would rest 
wholly on a phantom, because, to make practical sense, i.e. to show how his genuine agent 
would relate to herself and speak to the rest of us about herself, they required what the 
phantom represents, i.e. a unity inaccessible to the third-person that has a third-person effect.) 
 In short, the lack of fit cannot be resolved unless we recognise that Nietzsche’s aim is 
to critique the ‘I’’s supposed relationship to our actions and their geneses (see TI, The Four 
Great Errors), and to critique its influence on our actions and evaluations (D 109, 115, 116, 
                                                                                                                                                        
usefully discussed in Paul Katsafanas, On Homuncular Drives and the Structure of the Nietzschean Self, in: The 
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 45 (2014), pp.1-11. Constâncio’s suggestion that we should construe the conscious 
agent or the conscious mental state as the ‘total state’ of the organism, however, is useful for the lack of fit 
debate, cf. (WLN: 1[61]): “Every thought, every feeling, every will is not born of one particular drive but is a 
total state, a whole surface of the whole consciousness, and results from how the power of all the drives that 
constitute us is fixed at that moment — thus, the power of the drive that dominates just now as well as of the 
drives obeying or resisting” (Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks (WLN), Rüdiger Bittner 
(Ed.), Kate Sturge (Trans.), Cambridge 2003, p. 60). We should notice in the above, however, that Nietzsche 
does not claim that each individual drive has a perspective, but that the state of affairs between our drives (their 
power relations) constitute a total state that is a perspective on this or that thing or circumstance. Also, Nietzsche 
does not claim that we should replace mechanical or causal relations between drives for perspectival relations, 
but rather power relations. This accords with the solution we are calling the bridge and is more apt to avoid the 
homunculi problem by not ascribing a perspective to a drive. It is not this or that drive that takes a perspective, 
but this or that total state that corresponds to, or is identical to, this or that perspective that agents take on this or 
that thing (in the broad sense). We should be careful here not to project the inherent unity of the ‘I’ onto the 
drives, and a perspective is such a projection. Drives need not be unified in the same way as the ‘I’ in order for 
us to have a perspective on this or that thing or circumstance. Nietzsche is cautious to not overestimate conscious 
unity when compared with unity of the organism (cf. GS 11); the unity of the ‘I’ is for him merely a linguistic 
unity or the unity of a practice that does not always correspond with that to which it refers. There is no drive-
independent perspective than this total state, for Nietzsche. Accordingly, a drive does not take a perspective, but 
participates in the formation of a perspective by pushing or pulling towards this or that action or thing. A 
perspective is the total state relative to this or that thing or circumstance at that moment, which can and for 
Nietzsche often does change with time.  
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119; BGE 12, 17, 19). He focuses on the believing, the valuing and the becoming (the 
supposed content and modifications of the ‘I’) more than the agent (the ‘I’) who believes, 
values and becomes, not to eliminate the agent or first-person practical agency, for he cannot 
deny that we in fact do think, communicate and act using the ‘I’. On the contrary, he seeks to 
critique our presuppositions on the role that the ‘I’ plays in agency; not the practical use of the 
‘I’, but the assumption48 that we are unified, self-conscious subjects irrespective of the state of 
affairs of our drives. This is done as a preparation for offering an alternative, genuine account 
of agency as a unity that is willed and achieved, not one that is given. Nietzsche questions our 
assumption that our actions are modifications of a unified cognitive subject (see BGE 16) that 
imposes its unity on a manifold of conative states. He repudiates accounts of agency that takes 
the unified subject as simple, or an atom, or as given.
49
   
 In the following passage from BGE Nietzsche expresses his critique of the inherent 
unity of the ‘I’ attributed to first-person agency, only here it is approached from an analysis of 
what occurs when we will or resolve to undertake a course of action.
50
 This approach, we 
                                                 
48
 Nietzsche often construes this assumption as arising from grammar and language. Cf. TI, ‘Reason in 
Philosophy’, 5: “Language began at a time when psychology was in its most rudimentary form: we enter into a 
crudely fetishistic mindset when we call into consciousness [Bewußtsein] the basic presuppositions of the 
metaphysics of language — in the vernacular: the presuppositions of reason. It sees doers and deeds all over: it 
believes that will has causal efficacy: it believes in the ‘I’, in the I as being, in the I as substance, and it projects 
this belief in the I-substance onto all things — this is how it creates the concept of ‘thing’ in the first place …”.  
49 For a useful and elaborating discussion on Nietzsche’s critique of agential unity see Alexander Nehamas, 
Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1985, pp. 176-190. See also Robert Pippin, Nietzsche, 
Psychology, and First Philosophy, Chicago 2010, pp. 75-82, for an alternative discussion.  
50 Paul Katsafanas, Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency, in: Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00623.x, is right to show that Nietzsche transitions 
between various uses of the word will. Often and in the earlier period of his writing, he construes the will’s 
freedom relative to whether or not it is causally determined. In the latter period, he alters his criterion for 
construing the will in terms of whether or not it can overcome some resistance (internal or external) that arises 
with respect to the willed activity, i.e. whether it is strong or weak. The latter approach to the will shows us that 
Nietzsche has in mind an alternative account of agency. Nietzsche requires a story, however, which explains why 
and how “passion and reason are both efficacious” (p. 33). This is because if we run with the separation of 
reason from the passions by virtue of their nature or activity, we end up with causal interaction between two 
distinct things that somehow do not meet on a common ground, which brings about the kind of phantom we tried 
to illustrate. This reveals a core philosophical problem. We believe that Nietzsche can escape it only if he 
accepts the bridge between the first-person and third-person perspectives, which does not rely on causal 
interaction, but rather on a correlation or identity. In addition, if he argues for a different understanding of the 
self, which is no longer misleadingly construed as a subject (premised on grammar and language), but as an 
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believe, is crucial to his position on the apparent duality between the first-person and third-
person perspectives: 
 
On the one hand, we are, under the circumstances, both the one who commands and the one who obeys, 
and as the obedient one we are familiar with the feelings of compulsion, force, pressure, resistance, and 
motion that generally start right after the act of willing. On the other hand, however, we are in the habit 
of ignoring and deceiving ourselves about this duality (Zweiheit) by means of the synthetic concept of 
the “I”. As a result, a whole chain of erroneous conclusions, and, consequently, false evaluations have 
become attached to the will, – to such an extent that the one who wills believes, in good faith, that 
willing suffices for action. (BGE 19)
51
  
 
The interpretation of this passage we are advancing here is unusual, but we believe it to be the 
best for a genuine solution to the lack of fit.
52
 Nietzsche is patently aware of the apparent 
discord between the two perspectives, and that it rests on our use of the ‘I’. Notice, however, 
that he is not objecting to the use of the ‘I’, nor seeking to eliminate it. He is describing how 
the ‘I’ can affect our idea of ourselves and so self-knowledge at the most fundamental level, 
i.e. the relationship between willing and acting, and not between ourselves and our drives. It 
conceals the bridge between the two perspectives, which becomes apparent to us upon 
analysis of what ensues following our willing a course of action.
53
 He contends that what 
                                                                                                                                                        
activity, then we have resolved the problem of interaction—namely, there is no interaction. The ‘I’ and the 
drives are not two different things, but two different perspectives (alternatively two different descriptions) on the 
same thing, or better yet, activity.  
51
 See also GS 127: “With his assumption that only that which wills exists, Schopenhauer enthroned a primordial 
mythology; he seems never to have attempted an analysis of the will because like everyone else he believed in 
the simplicity and immediacy of all willing — whereas willing is actually such a well-practised mechanism that 
it almost escapes the observing eye”.  
52
 For an alternative analysis of this passage and its implications for morality see Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche’s 
Task: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil, New Haven 2001, pp. 49-50. For an interpretation that comes 
very close to the bridge but unfortunately does not avoid the homunculi problem see Clark / Dudrick, Nietzsche 
on the Will, pp. 255-257. 
53 Nietzsche reasons on the basis of the possibility and inevitability of a bridge between the two perspectives, 
e.g. see D 48: “‘Know yourself’ is the whole of science. – Only when he has attained a final knowledge of all 
things will man come to know himself. For things are only the boundaries of man.” He does not draw a boundary 
between the two perspectives, but strongly holds the idea that through the third-person perspective, the agent can 
attain self-knowledge and self-mastery (see BGE 32). Again, this is not the claim that the ‘true’ self then lies in 
the third-person and that the first-person is therefore superfluous, but only that it can be useful to the project of 
self-mastery, i.e. to our willing a course of action and following through. Nietzsche’s contention is that we do 
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occurs in the process of willing is a distinct kind of activity, i.e. a relation of command and 
obedience, which is present in both perspectives. In the first-person perspective, it is a 
command and obedience played within one person. Consider when ‘I’ deliberate over a 
course of action and am undecided, or when ‘I’ struggle to maintain a course of action in light 
of some alternative temptation, or when ‘I’ reason and resolve to attend to this and not that, or 
when ‘I’ deviate from or even abandon a course of action to undertake a new one. In each 
case and from the first-person perspective, ‘I’ am the one who overcomes the temptation, or 
who alters the course of action, or who feels the resistance when ‘I’ wish to act contrary to my 
values or aims, or who is overwhelmed by my own temptation.  
 In the third-person, however, the same phenomena listed above can be construed as 
relations of command and obedience between drives and their rank order (BGE 6); rank order 
here refers to the unity (or disunity) of the agent’s resolve relative to her actions from the 
third-person perspective. For example, one’s indecision over a course of action represents an 
unresolved conflict between drives; the deviation from a course of action is the consequence 
of a disruption of the rank order of drives; the resistance to a particular activity is the direct 
consequence of a drive(s) becoming active in opposition to the others, and so on. Therefore, 
closer analysis of the activity of willing or resolving to undertake a course of action reveals to 
us the bridge between the first-person and third-person perspectives that he requires to resolve 
the lack of fit and make sense of his account of genuine agency. This bridge is the act of will 
and its corresponding action.
54
 
 Both perspectives contain the same activity of resolving to act and all that comes with 
this resolution, but different approaches to it from different perspectives: between one thing 
and its modifications, or a relation between a multiplicity of things and their order of rank. 
We describe and construe the same thing, event or activity from two distinct perspectives and 
                                                                                                                                                        
not necessarily find or perceive a self, but will a self (cf. HH II, 366). See also GS 333 for more on Nietzsche’s 
commitment to what we call the bridge.  
54 Rex Welshon, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, Chesham Bucks 2004, pp. 152-156, is right to place an emphasis 
on Nietzsche’s conception of the act of will or willing as useful for resolving the lack of fit. We worry, however, 
that conceiving of an interaction between consciousness and the drives, as he argues, makes it difficult for 
Nietzsche to have a plausible and coherent solution. We construe the passages where Nietzsche describes the 
interaction between the drives and consciousness as probative and critical of conceptions of agency that rest on 
the assumption that genuine agency is determined wholly by the self-conscious ‘I’. Thus instead of an interaction 
between the ‘I’ and the drives, we suggest that Nietzsche requires an interaction between the ‘I’ and its actions 
(in the first-person), or between drive-relations and their corresponding actions (in the third-person). Both refer 
to the same thing: the act of will or activity of willing. We favour this interpretation of the passage. 
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in two distinct ways, neither of which can be more right or wrong because both refer to and 
are grounded in the relationship between the basic preferred unit of will or resolve (be it the 
‘I’ or a ‘drive’) and its correlate action on the basis of which we both understand and evaluate 
agency. Problems arise only when we attempt to attribute the unity of the ‘I’ that is inherent to 
first-person practical agency to its modifications, i.e. its actions across time, or, what comes to 
the same, when we attempt to construe this inherent unity as more than just a practice. Equal 
problems will and do arise when we do the reverse and eliminate the unity of the ‘I’ in favour 
of relations between drives and their rank order. Naturalist and epiphenomenalist readings 
who use the ‘drive’ as the basic unit of will or resolve, will encounter similar problems when 
they try to apply the unity of a multiplicity to that of the ‘I’ in an attempt to preserve the first-
person practical agency (though we cannot show this here). Elimination or reduction of the ‘I’ 
is a consequence of the attempt to dissociate the two perspectives from their bridge, namely 
the act of will and what it entails. This elimination or reduction would be akin to claiming 
that, upon closer inspection at its composition, the chair in front of us is not a chair because 
we recognize that it is just arrangement of atoms (or subatomic motions), and that we ought to 
abandon all talk of chairs and speak only of atoms (or subatomic motions), which is absurd. 
The fact that this chair is this composite of atoms is untouched by our calling it a chair and 
not a composite of subatomic motions in all cases or contexts. The same reasoning operates in 
our understanding of how the ‘I’ relates to the drives. 
 Nietzsche analyses and evaluates agency on the basis of how our ‘I’-claims relate to 
their respective action(s), not solely on the basis of the claims themselves. Genuine agency, or 
a normative conception of agency, is based on the relationship between the preferred basic 
unit of will and our actions, not solely on the basis of our thoughts about our actions.
55
 Since 
our actions are determined by our drives-relations, genuine agency can in turn be understood 
as the unity of one’s drives relative to one’s actions.56 Notice, however, that for us to know 
whether or not the drives are unified we must look to the coherence and unity of our actions 
                                                 
55 For a discussion on Nietzsche’s prioritization of actions over thoughts about actions see Welshon, The 
Philosophy of Nietzsche, pp. 140-1. 
56 For a discussion on the relationship between the unity of drives and genuine agency see, Lanier Anderson, 
Nietzsche on strength, self-knowledge, and achieving individuality, in: International Studies in Philosophy 38 
(2006), pp. 89-115; Ken Gemes, Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individual, in: Ken 
Gemes / Simon May (Eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, New York 2009, pp. 33-50; Simon May, 
Nihilism and the Free Self, in: Ken Gemes / Simon May (Eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, New 
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since we have no actual representation of a drive independent from the action, and so a drive 
cannot be construed independent from the action it is a basic unit for. Equally the action is in 
all cases what a person or an ‘I’ performs. The ‘drives’ and the ‘I’ should thus be construed as 
two different units of the same thing we call an ‘act of will’ from two different perspectives. 
The act of will for Nietzsche, which is borrowed from Schopenhauer, finds its representation 
in the action. This does not render the ‘I’ superfluous, it merely changes its role with respect 
to genuine agency and, for Nietzsche, debunks an age-old assumption. How we analyse the 
will and so how we determine what kind of a will it is, i.e. strong or weak, is no longer done 
on the basis of ‘I’ claims alone, but on how they relate to their corresponding actions. 
Genuine agency for Nietzsche is having a strong will, and thus a consistent relationship 
between one’s ‘I’ claims and one’s actions. The ‘I’ refers to the self as a whole, but it does not 
determine its unity or disunity, which is, for Nietzsche, determined by the relationship 
between it and its corresponding action. Notice also that the same is true of the rank order of 
drives: this order too merely refers to the agent or self as a whole, without claiming that the 
relation between the drives in the order is necessarily unified, i.e. weak or strong. 
Consequently, the ‘I’ and the drives refer to the same thing: the act of will, or better yet, the 
activity of willing or resolving to do something, which, for Nietzsche, is all that we are. They 
are therefore best construed as two distinct perspectives on this activity that employ two 
distinct concepts that merely characterize this distinction in perspective—nothing more.   
 There is a bridge between the two perspectives, for Nietzsche, and it is found in 
willing a course of action, which, when analysed, becomes apparent as an activity present and 
discernible in both perspectives. The activity of willing that we call the bridge, shows us that 
he is not committed to construing an action as a modification of a unified subject that passes 
on its inherent unity, but as the result of an activity that can, and often does result in unified 
action, but not necessarily. His sovereign individual’s activity of willing must yield unified 
action because it is his model for genuine agency.
57
 The key point for Nietzsche is that unified 
action is not solely a consequence of the inherent unity of the ‘I’ and practical agency, nor 
solely of the complex of drives. It is the consequence of an activity that can be described both 
in ‘I’-terms and in drive-terms. The key philosophical point is that the first-person and third-
person are merely two different perspectives on an activity, and neither can claim epistemic or 
                                                                                                                                                        
York 2009, pp. 89-106; Richardson, Nietzsche’s Freedoms; and Christa Davis-Acampora, Contesting Nietzsche, 
Chicago 2013, p. 190. 
57 For an informative account and discussion on the sovereign individual as Nietzsche’s attempt at a normative 
account of agency see Anderson, What is a Nietzschean Self?, pp. 228-232. 
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metaphysical superiority over the other with respect to agency without reduction, elimination 
or some kind of phantom.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The transcendental reading may have rescued first-person practical agency, and showed us a 
lack of fit between two Nietzschean perspectives on agency, but not resolved it. It moved the 
burden to a distinction between different types of practical agency. It was justified in arguing 
that if Nietzsche’s aim is to eliminate first-person practical agency, then he must answer to its 
charges. The reading is wrong to charge Nietzsche with eliminativism, however. His attempt 
to naturalise agency is a critique on our conception of agency on the basis of the errors of self-
knowledge. He rejects the idea that agency as such is exhausted by use of the first-person ‘I’, 
and by the claim that the self-conscious ‘I’ is separated from our experiences and actions.58  
 
We have argued that Nietzsche is aiming for a different approach to genuine agency, 
which does not leave us with construing the ‘I’ as a phantom, nor with elimination of first-
person practical agency. But, in order to accommodate this approach, Nietzsche requires first-
person practical agency. Correspondingly, in order to explain how practical agency fits with 
his rejections of the role of the unity of the ‘I’, he also requires what we call the bridge. If the 
bridge proves to be successful, then Nietzsche can coherently argue for a conception of 
agency as an activity, which is construed in first-person terms as my willing a course of action 
(not necessarily my following through), and in the third-person as the result of hierarchical 
drive-relations. The content of the ‘I’ (what ‘we’ attribute to ourselves) and the dispositional 
manifold (the drives) are thus the same thing construed from different perspectives. They are 
not two distinct things. The key to recognizing the bridge, we have argued, is to shift our 
                                                 
58 A passage that is illuminating regarding Nietzsche’s approach to consciousness is GS 354; also D 26 and 212. 
Another passage is In Z I, The Despisers of the Body: “Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a 
powerful commander, an unknown wise man – he is called self. He lives in your body, he is your body”. In these 
passages Nietzsche advances an account of consciousness that is subordinate to the organism and its 
development, not something transcendent, nor even transcendental to it. This entails that whatever consciousness 
adds to the drives, it must be explicable in their terms or subordinate to them. Think of the previous in terms of a 
probative question he poses: “How could anything originate out of its opposite?” (BGE 2) and he answers, “we 
can doubt, first, whether opposites even exist”. In accordance with his own thoughts, we claim, it is misleading 
to construe consciousness and the drives as two things distinct in kind that interact. To construe consciousness 
and the drives as interacting and being mutually efficacious does not resolve the problem; it unsuccessfully 
sidesteps it. 
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focus from the relation between ‘I’-thoughts and drives, to that between ‘I’-thoughts and 
actions; or, if we use the drive as our basic unit of resolve, then we should shift away from the 
relation between drives and conscious thought to the relationship between drives and actions. 
Genuine agency, for Nietzsche, is thus an individual’s willing or resolving a course of action 
and simply following through.
59
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